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Abstract. Hearers get at the intended meaning of uncooperative utter-
ances (i.e. utterances that conflict with the prescriptions laid down by
the Gricean maxims) by pragmatically deriving sentences that reconcile
these utterances with the maxims. Such pragmatic derivations are made
according to pragmatic rules called implicatures. As they are pragmatic
in nature, the conclusions drawn by applying implicatures remain uncer-
tain. In other words, they may have to be withdrawn in view of further
information. Because of this last feature, Levinson argued that implica-
tures should be formally modeled as non–monotonic or default rules of
inference. In this paper, I will do exactly this: by relying on the Adaptive
Logics Programme, I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as
default inference rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind
of implicatures, viz scalar implicatures.
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1 Scalar Implicatures
In contemporary pragmatics, the Gricean maxims (see [6, pp. 26–27]) are inter-
preted not as actual maxims, but as heuristic markers for both speakers and
hearers (see e.g. [1],[10]).
Instead of thinking about them as rules (or rules of thumb) or behavioral
norms, it is useful to think of them as primarily inferential heuristics which
then motivate the behavioral norms. (sic, [10, p. 35])
The maxims provide speakers the guidelines to model their utterances in a way
that best serves their communicative purposes (whatever these may be: infor-
mation transfer, transfer of emotions,...). Moreover, they provide hearers the
guidelines to decipher the intended meaning of utterances that are in conflict
with the maxims (henceforth, these will be called uncooperative utterances). The
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latter is done by deriving sentences that reconcile uncooperative utterances with
the maxims (obviously, hearers will only do so in case they are convinced the
speaker assumed they are capable to get at the actual meaning of the utterance
in spite of its deviance from the prescriptions stated by the maxims). These
derivations are obviously not deductive derivations, but pragmatic ones. Hence,
the intrinsic features of this kind of derivations are distinct from those of deduc-
tive ones. Most importantly, the consequences of pragmatic derivations are only
accepted in a defeasible way, meaning that they might be withdrawn at some
point, for example in case the speaker explicitly rejects them, or because they
conflict with the background knowledge shared by speaker and hearer (see e.g.
[7],[9],[10]).
The pragmatic rules that enable hearers to get at the intended meaning of
uncooperative utterances, are called implicatures. As these rules yield defeasible
consequences, Levinson [10, ch. 1] has argued convincingly that they should be
captured formally as non–monotonic or default rules of inference. That is exactly
what I will do in this paper: by relying on the Adaptive Logics Programme (see
e.g. [2],[3]), I will provide a formal explication of implicatures as default inference
rules. More specifically, I will do so for a particular kind of implicatures, viz
scalar implicatures. The latter are based on linguistic scales,1 which are partially
ordered sets of sets of linguistic expressions 〈∆1, ...,∆n〉 (the partial ordering
relation has to be defined over the sets of linguistic expressions “in a contextually
salient way,” see [10, p. 105]). The linguistic expressions in ∆i are considered
more high–ranked than those in ∆j in case i < j.
Example 1. The following are all linguistic scales: 〈 and, or 〉, 〈 all,most,many,
some 〉, 〈 succeed, try 〉, 〈 book, {chapter 1, chapter 2, ...} 〉,...2
Scalar implicatures arise from linguistic scales in the following way: the assertion
by a speaker of a sentence containing a low–ranked linguistic expression will force
the hearer to implicate the negation of the corresponding sentences with more
high-ranked expressions. For, so the reasoning goes, if the speaker would have
been in a position to use a more high–ranked expression, he would have done so
(in order to comply with the maxim of quantity that states that we should be
as informative as our communicative purposes require us to be).
Example 2. “John ate some of the cookies” implicates that “John didn’t eat
all of the cookies”
Finally, remark that I am not concerned with the specific characteristics
of linguistic scales (what Levinson called the diagnostics of linguistic scales),
nor with how people recognize a linguistic scale in a particular conversational
context (what I would like to call the psychology of linguistic scales). I am
merely concerned with how scalar implicatures are used by hearers in order to
1 Levinson [10, p. 105] called these scales Hirschberg scales. I have opted for the more
neutral linguistic scales coined by Verhoeven [12, p. 9].
2 In case of singletons, I have dropped the brackets.
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get at the intended meaning of assertions made by speakers. Hence, I will simply
presuppose that some linguistic scales are available to hearers in a particular
conversational context. Formally, this means that the information available to
the hearer in a conversational context is taken to be a couple 〈 Γu∪Γbk , Γ ls 〉,
where Γu represents the utterances made by the speaker (as they are heard by
the hearer), Γbk represents the background knowledge shared by both speaker
and hearer (as supposed by the hearer), and Γ ls contains all linguistic scales
that are available to the hearer in the particular context.
2 The Role of Classical Logic
The consequences obtained by means of pragmatic inference steps (in casu, scalar
implicatures) are defeasible, which means that speakers might withdraw them
at a certain point. The reasons for withdrawal can be twofold. First of all, new
information might be acquired that is in conflict with the pragmatically derived
conclusions (e.g. the speaker has made some new utterances). In formal terms,
this comes down to non–monotonicity. Secondly, pragmatic consequences might
also be withdrawn because the deductive consequences of some of the utter-
ances made by the speaker contradict them. In practice, this comes down to the
fact that people sometimes draw (wrong) pragmatic conclusions from utterances
before they have full insight in what the speaker has actually said. Once they
have obtained more insight (which, let’s face it, might not happen at all), they
will then withdraw these conclusions. Formally, this corresponds to the fact that
people are not logically omniscient (which, in the approach presented below, is
a strictly proof theoretic feature).
The second reason for withdrawing pragmatic consequences clearly shows
that scalar implicatures are always applied against a deductive background (i.e.
they are ampliative inference rules). Traditionally, this deductive background
is captured by means of a standard logic (SL),3 which means that the logical
symbols (the logical connectives, modal operators,...) are interpreted standardly.
However, when trying to explicate implicatures formally, interpreting the logical
symbols in the standard way leads to the so–called implementation–problem (for
a discussion related to the or–implicature, see [8],[11],[13]). In short, this comes
down to the fact that the implicatures either generate too many or too few
pragmatic consequences (dependent on the way you determine when to withdraw
pragmatic consequences). The problem is related to the fact that SL doesn’t
distinguish between sentences the hearer heard the speaker utter and sentences
the hearer merely derived from those she heard the speaker utter. Obviously, the
implicatures should only be applied to the former, not to the latter.
3 This standard logic is usually an extension of classical logic (CL). Consequently, the
approach I will present below is not only applicable to the classical connectives and
quantifiers, but also to a whole range of non–classical quantifiers (most, many,...)
and modal operators (necessary, possible,...).
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In this paper, the deductive background is captured by means of a non–
standard logic, viz the logic SLu, a particular extension of SL.4 This logic is de-
fined over the language Lu that not only contains the standard logical symbols,
but also contains utterance–symbols. The latter are non–standard logical symbols
that are used to formally represent the utterances made by the speaker. More
specifically, utterances are represented by sentences that only contain utterance–
symbols (these are called utterance–sentences). The other information available
to the hearer in a conversational context (i.e. the shared background knowl-
edge) is represented by sentences only containing standard symbols (these sen-
tences are called standard sentences). In view of section 1, this means that the
set Γu only contains utterance–sentences and that the set Γbk only contains
standard sentences! In this way, the logic SLu is able to formally make the dis-
tinction between sentences the hearer heard the speaker utter and sentences the
hearer derived from those sentences. As a consequence, in the adaptive logics
approach presented below, scalar implicatures will be captured as default infer-
ence rules that may only be applied to utterance–sentences. For, this avoids the
implementation–problem in a way that resembles the actual reasoning process
at hand.
A closing remark is necessary though. From an utterance–sentence A, it is
always possible to derive the corresponding standard sentence B by means of
the logic SLu.5 As a consequence, despite the non–standard interpretation of
the utterance–symbols, the hearer is still able to derive all standard deductive
consequences from the utterances made by the speaker, as is shown by theorem
1.6
Theorem 1. For Γ the set of standard sentences corresponding to the utterance–
sentences in Γu and for A a standard sentence:
Γu ∪ Γbk `SLu A iff Γ ∪ Γbk `SL A.
3 The Adaptive Logics Approach
The adaptive logic SIs now captures the reasoning process of the hearer while
trying to uncover the full intended meaning of the utterances made by the
speaker in a conversational context. In line with the argumentation of Levin-
son [10, ch. 1], the adaptive logic SIs characterizes scalar implicatures proof
theoretically as non–monotonic inference rules. Below, only a general (and quite
intuitive) characterization of SIs will be given.
4 A specific SLu will be characterized in section 4.1. Moreover, the non–standard
extension of propositional CL (called CLu) has been characterized in [11].
5 For a good understanding, the standard sentence B corresponding to the utterance–
sentence A is obtained by replacing all utterance–symbols in A by the corresponding
standard symbols.
6 For all SL and SLu, the proof of theorem 1 is completely analogous to the proof of
theorem 3 in [11, pp. 12–13]. Hence, no proof will be given in this paper.
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General Characterization of SIs. All standard adaptive logics are charac-
terized completely by the following three elements: a lower limit logic (LLL), a
set of abnormalities Ω (a set of formulas characterized by a logical form F), and
an adaptive strategy.7 In case of the logic SIs, the LLL is the logic SLu (see
section 2).8 Given a conversational context 〈Γu∪Γbk , Γ ls〉, the consequences
derivable from the premise set Γu ∪ Γbk by means of the logic SLu are called
the deductive consequences of that premise set, which means that they are non–
defeasible (i.e. they cannot be withdrawn!). In other words, the logic SLu is the
stable, deductive background against which some defeasible inference steps can
be made.
Where A[e] expresses that the linguistic expression e occurs in the formula
A, the set of abnormalities Ω of SIs is defined as follows:
Definition 1. Ω = {A[e]∧B[e′] | 〈..., {e′}, ..., {e}, ...〉 ∈ Γ ls; A[e] is an utterance–
sentence; B[e′] is obtained from A[e] by (1) replacing all utterance–symbols by
the corresponding standard symbols and (2) replacing the linguistic expression e
by e′}.
The defeasible consequences of the logic SIs (in casu, those representing the
consequences obtained by applying scalar implicatures) are yielded by treating
the abnormalities (the elements of Ω) in a particular way. More specifically,
the logic SIs falsifies as many abnormalities as possible. In general, this comes
down to the following: if a formula A ∨ Dab(∆) is an SLu–consequence of a
premise set Γ (with Dab(∆) a finite disjunction of abnormalities), the formula
A is considered an SIs–consequence of Γ on the condition that none of the
abnormalities in ∆ can be interpreted as true.
The above implies that a formula A is a possible SIs–consequence of a premise
set Γ in case A is either a deductive or a defeasible consequence of Γ . Formally,
this is expressed as follows:
Definition 2. The formula A is a possible SIs–consequence of the premise set
Γ iff Γ `SLu A ∨Dab(∆).
If ∆ = ∅, the formula A is a deductive consequence of Γ , while in case ∆ 6= ∅, A
is a defeasible consequence of Γ . As deductive consequences of a premise set are
derivable unconditionally, they necessarily enter the SIs–consequence set of a
premise set. On the other hand, defeasible consequences are only derivable con-
ditionally, so that some might have to be withdrawn from the SIs–consequence
set of a premise set.
Which of the defeasible consequences have to be withdrawn, is determined by
the Dab–consequences of the premise set, together with the adaptive strategy.
7 For an elaborated characterization of the standard format of adaptive logics, see e.g.
[2],[3].
8 Obviously, the logic SIs will differ according to the particular logic SLu that is
chosen as its LLL. Hence, one might say that there are multiple versions of the logic
SIs. One of these will be characterized in section 4.2. In this section though, the
logic SIs is characterized in general.
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A Dab–consequence of a premise set Γ is a finite disjunction of abnormalities
that is a deductively derivable from Γ .
Definition 3. Dab(∆) is a Dab–consequence of Γ iff Γ `SLu Dab(∆).
As no abnormalities need to be falsified in order to derive a Dab–consequence
from a premise set, a Dab–consequence of a premise set is true unconditionally.
Hence, some of the disjuncts of a Dab–consequence have to be true. This im-
plies that some (and possibly all) of the defeasible consequences obtained by
presupposing the falsity of these disjuncts have to be withdrawn. In the end, the
adaptive strategy is decisive, for the latter provides the guideline to cope with
the abnormalities occurring in the Dab–consequences of a premise set. As the
adaptive strategy of the logic SIs is the normal selections strategy,9 a defeasible
consequence of a premise set Γ obtained by presupposing the falsity of all abnor-
malities in ∆, is withdrawn in case the formula Dab(∆) is a Dab–consequence
of Γ . Hence, in view of definition 2, SIs–derivability is defined as follows:
Definition 4. Γ `SIs A iff Γ `SLu A ∨Dab(∆) and Γ 0SLu Dab(∆).
Example. To illustrate the logic SIs, consider the example below.
Example 3. Consider the following conversational context: 〈{A[e]} ∪ ∅, {{e′, ...},
{e}}〉. From the premise set {A[e]}, the formula ¬B[e′] ∨ (A[e] ∧ B[e′]) is de-
ductively derivable. By interpreting the abnormality A[e] ∧ B[e′] as false, the
formula ¬B[e′] may be derived defeasibly. At this point, the conversational con-
text doesn’t provide any reason to withdraw the formula ¬B[e′] from the adap-
tive consequence set of {A[e]}. Nevertheless, if at some later point, the speaker
should utter B[e′], the conversational context is extended to 〈{A[e], B[e′]} ∪
∅, {{e′, ...}, {e}}〉. Consequently, the abnormality A[e] ∧ B[e′] cannot be consid-
ered as false anymore (because it is now deductively derivable from the premise
set {A[e], B[e′]}). This implies that the formula ¬B[e′] has to be withdrawn from
the adaptive consequence set of {A[e], B[e′]}.
4 Applying the Adaptive Framework
Let’s consider a particular application of the general approach set out in the
previous sections. More specifically, consider the cookie conversation below which
contains some applications of scalar implicatures based on the linguistic scale
〈All, Many, Some〉.
Example 4 (The Cookie Conversation). John’s mother is talking to the nanny
about John’s eating behavior.
Mother Did John eat something this afternoon?
9 A lot of other strategies have been characterized in the adaptive logics literature
(see e.g. [2],[3]), but these will not be considered here.
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Nanny Yes, he ate some cookies.
implicates that John didn’t eat many cookies.
implicates that John didn’t eat all cookies.
Nanny In fact, he ate many.
forces withdrawal of John didn’t eat many cookies.
Mother He didn’t eat them all, did he?
Nanny No, he didn’t.
In view of the linguistic scale present in the conversational context described
above, viz the scale 〈All, Many, Some〉, the assertion of the nanny that John ate
some cookies, yields two scalar implicatures. For, from the nanny’s assertion
John’s mother will pragmatically derive that John didn’t eat all cookies, as well
as that he didn’t eat many of them. However, when the nanny afterwards asserts
that John ate a lot of cookies, John’s mother is forced to withdraw one of those
pragmatic conclusions, viz the latter one.
Representation of Linguistic Expressions. To capture the implicatures
involved in the cookie conversation, the language L of classical logic isn’t satis-
factory, for not all linguistic expressions in the linguistic scale 〈All, Many, Some〉
can be expressed by classical means. Hence, the standard logic SL capturing
the deductive background against which the scalar implicatures are performed
(see section 2) cannot be classical logic. Consequently, I will take SL to be a
straightforward extension of classical logic, viz the logic CL∃10.
The logic CL∃10 is based on the language L∃10, obtained by adding the gen-
eralized quantifier ∃10 to the language L of classical logic.10 This newly added
quantifier expresses that there are at least ten objects in the domain for which
something is the case. Consequently, the quantifier ∃10 is semantically charac-
terized as follows:11
SP∃10 vM ((∃10α )Aα) = 1 iff there are β1, ..., β10 ∈ C ∪ O such that v(β1) 6=
v(β2), v(β1) 6= v(β3),..., v(β9) 6= v(β10), and vM (Aβ1) = ... = vM (Aβ10)
= 1.
Proof theoretically, the characterization of ∃10 is obtained by means of the fol-
lowing three axioms:
A∃10a (∃10α )Aα ⊃ (∃α)Aα
A∃10b (Aβ1∧ ...∧Aβ10∧¬(β1 = β2)∧¬(β1 = β3)∧ ...∧¬(β9 = β10)) ⊃ (∃10α )Aα
A∃10c ((∀α)Aα ∧ (∃10α )Bα) ⊃ (∃10α )Aα
Soundness and completeness proofs for CL∃10 are obtained by standard means.
As a consequence, these are left to the reader.
10 For more on generalized quantifiers, see e.g. [5],[15].
11 Any member of the domain is taken to be named by a member of C ∪O, with C the
set of individual constants and O a set of pseudo–constants (see also section 4.1).
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Besides the quantifier ∃10, the language L∃10 also contains a number of de-
fined quantifiers, viz the generalized quantifiers All, Many and Some. These are
relational quantifiers, which means that they express a relation between two for-
mulas A and B. For example, the quantifier All expresses that all objects that
are A are B as well (the other quantifiers are explicated analogously). Formally,
the quantifiers All, Many and Some are defined as follows:12
Definition 5. For α an individual variable:
(Allα)(Aα, Bα) =df (∀α)(Aα ⊃ Bα)
(Manyα)(Aα, Bα) =df (∃10α )(Aα ∧Bα)
(Someα)(Aα, Bα) =df (∃α)(Aα ∧Bα)
Some remarks concerning these defined quantifiers are necessary. First of all,
the quantifier Many is generally considered to be context–dependent (see e.g.
[15]). Hence, in function of the conversational context provided by the cookie
conversation, I have arbitrarily taken Many to be at least ten. Secondly, the
introduction of the defined quantifiers is necessary to capture the real meaning
of the scalar implicatures occurring in the cookie example. More specifically,
to capture the scalar implicature from some to not all. For, remember that a
scalar implicature is obtained by negating a sentence in which a low–ranked
linguistic expression (in casu, some) is replaced by a more high–ranked one (in
casu, all). In spite of appearances, one cannot capture this formally by deriving
the negation of a formula in which the logical expression ∃ is replaced by the
logical expression ∀. For example, consider the cookie conversation: suppose that
(∃α)(Cα∧Ejα) expresses that John ate some cookies (literally, the formula states
that there are objects that are cookies and are eaten by John). Moreover, now
suppose that one would (pragmatically) derive the formula ¬(∀α)(Cα ∧ Ejα)
from the formula (∃α)(Cα ∧Ejα). Obviously, that doesn’t capture the intended
meaning of the scalar implicature at all, for the derived formula doesn’t state
that John didn’t eat all cookies, but states that not everything is a cookie and
is eaten by John. The problem resides in the fact that this formula doesn’t only
refer to cookies, but also to tables, chairs,... Hence, John may well have eaten
all cookies, as long as there is something that is not a cookie, the sentence still
applies (which is obviously not what was intended). The quantifiers All, Many
and Some are introduced to avoid this kind of mix up between linguistic and
logical expressions.
Next Up. In the remaining of this paper, a particular version of the adaptive
logic SIs will be characterized, viz the one that is able to capture the scalar
implicatures occurring in the cookie conversation. This particular version of the
logic SIs will be called CLs∃10. Well now, given the adaptive logics approach
outlined in section 3, the lower limit logic of the logic CLs∃10 is a particular
extension of the logic standardly taken to capture the deductive background
12 By using brackets and commas, I follow the notational conventions of [5].
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against which the scalar implicatures are performed. For the logic CLs∃, this is
the logic CLu∃10, an extension of the logic CL∃10 discussed above. Below, the
logic CLu∃10 will be characterized first (in section 4.1). Next, a characterization
of the adaptive logic CLs∃10 will be provided (in section 4.2). At the end, the
cookie conversation will be reconsidered (in section 4.3).
4.1 The Lower Limit Logic CLu∃10
The logic CLu∃10 is based on the language Lu∃10. The latter is obtained by adding
to the language L∃10 of CL∃10 an utterance–symbol s˙ for each standard logical
symbol s. As a consequence, the utterance–symbols of the language Lu∃10 are the
following:
¬˙, ∧˙, ∨˙, ⊃˙, ≡˙, ∃˙, ∃˙10, ∀˙, =˙, A˙ll, M˙any, S˙ome
As their standard counterparts, the utterance–symbols A˙ll, M˙any and S˙ome are
defined connectives.
Definition 6. For α an individual variable:
(A˙llα)(Aα, Bα) =df (∀˙α)(Aα⊃˙Bα)
(M˙anyα)(Aα, Bα) =df (∃˙10α )(Aα∧˙Bα)
(S˙omeα)(Aα, Bα) =df (∃˙α)(Aα∧˙Bα)
Moreover, in the remaining of this paper, also the connectives ⊃,≡, ⊃˙ and ≡˙ will
be treated as defined connectives (defined in the standard way). Consequently,
only the most essential logical symbols are taken to be primitive.
Finally, let S,Pr, C,V, and Wu∃10 be respectively the set of sentential letters,
the set of predicative letters of rank r, the set of individual constants, the set of
individual variables, and the set of well–formed formulas of the language Lu∃10.
All are defined as usual.
Semantics. The semantics of the logic CLu∃10 isn’t defined for the language
Lu∃10, but for the language Lu+∃10. The latter is obtained by adding the set of
pseudo–constants O to the language Lu∃10. In the semantics of CLu∃10, the set
C ∪ O plays the role usually played by C, with this difference that there will be
required that any element of the domain is named by at least one element of
C ∪ O. As a consequence, the introduction of O greatly simplifies the semantic
characterization of the quantifiers.13
Let Fu+∃10 be the set of all formulas of Lu+∃10 (both open and closed ones), and
letWu+∃10 be the set of all well–formed (closed) formulas of Lu+∃10. Both are defined
in the standard way. Moreover, let W s˙+∃10 be the set of well–formed formulas of
Lu+∃10 of which the main logical symbols are utterance–symbols (see definition 7),
and let W ¬˙+∃10 be the set of well–formed formulas ¬˙A of Lu+∃10 such that the main
logical symbol of the formula A is a standard symbol (see definition 8).
13 Obviously, the set O should have at least the cardinality of the largest model con-
sidered. If there is no such model, a suitable O has to be selected for each model.
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Definition 7. W s˙+∃10 =
⋃
( {¬˙A | A ∈ S},
{¬˙piβ1...βr | pi ∈ Pr and β1, ..., βr ∈ C ∪ O},
{α=˙β | α, β ∈ C ∪ O},
{¬˙(α=˙β) | α, β ∈ C ∪ O},
{¬˙¬˙A | A ∈ Wu+∃10},
{A∧˙B | A,B ∈ Wu+∃10},
{¬˙(A∧˙B) | A,B ∈ Wu+∃10},
{A∨˙B | A,B ∈ Wu+∃10},
{¬˙(A∨˙B) | A,B ∈ Wu+∃10},
{(∃˙α)Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10},
{¬˙(∃˙α)Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10},
{(∃˙10α )Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10},
{¬˙(∃˙10α )Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10},
{(∀˙α)Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10},
{¬˙(∀˙α)Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10} )
Definition 8. W ¬˙+∃10 =
⋃
( {¬˙(α = β) | α, β ∈ C ∪ O},
{¬˙¬A | A ∈ Wu+∃10},
{¬˙(A ∧B) | A,B ∈ Wu+∃10},
{¬˙(A ∨B) | A,B ∈ Wu+∃10},
{¬˙(∃α)Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10},
{¬˙(∃10α )Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10},
{¬˙(∀α)Aα | Aα ∈ Fu+∃10} )
Characterizing Models. A CLu∃10–model M is a couple 〈D, v〉 with D a non-
empty domain and v an assignment function. The latter is defined as follows:
C1.1 v : S ∪W s˙+∃10 ∪W ¬˙+∃10 → {0, 1}
C1.2 v : C ∪ O → D (where D = {v(α) | α ∈ C ∪ O})
C1.3 v : Pr → ρ(D) (the power set of the r–th Cartesian product of D)
The assignment function v of the modelM is extended to a valuation function
vM :Wu+∃10 → {0, 1} by the following semantic postulates:
C2.1 For A ∈ S ∪W ¬˙+∃10, vM (A)= 1 iff v(A) = 1.
C2.2 For α, β ∈ C ∪ O, vM (α = β) = 1 iff v(α) = v(β).
C2.3 For pi ∈ Pr and β1, ..., βr ∈ C∪O, vM (piβ1...βr) = 1 iff 〈v(β1), ..., v(βr)〉 ∈
v(pi).
C2.4 vM (¬A) = 1 iff vM (A) = 0.
C2.5 vM (A ∧B) = 1 iff vM (A) = 1 and vM (B) = 1.
C2.6 vM (A ∨B) = 1 iff vM (A) = 1 or vM (B) = 1.
C2.7 vM ((∃α)Aα) = 1 iff vM (Aβ) = 1 for at least one β ∈ C ∪ O.
C2.8 vM ((∃10α )Aα) = 1 iff there are β1, ..., β10 ∈ C∪O such that v(β1) 6= v(β2),
v(β1) 6= v(β3),..., v(β9) 6= v(β10), and vM (Aβ1) = ... = vM (Aβ10) = 1.
C2.9 vM ((∀α)Aα) = 1 iff vM (Aβ) = 1 for all β ∈ C ∪ O.
C2.10 For A ∈ S, vM (¬˙A)= 1 iff vM (A) = 0, and v(¬˙A) = 1.
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C2.11 For α, β ∈ C ∪ O, vM (α=˙β) = 1 iff v(α) = v(β), and v(α=˙β) = 1.
C2.12 For α, β ∈ C ∪O, vM (¬˙(α=˙β)) = 1 iff v(α) 6= v(β), and v(¬˙(α=˙β)) = 1.
C2.13 For pi ∈ Pr and β1, ..., βr ∈ C ∪O, vM (¬˙piβ1...βr) = 1 iff vM (piβ1...βr) =
0, and v(¬˙piβ1...βr) = 1.
C2.14 vM (¬˙¬˙A)= 1 iff vM (A) = 1, and v(¬˙¬˙A) = 1.
C2.15 vM (A∧˙B) = 1 iff vM (A) = 1 and vM (B) = 1, and v(A∧˙B) = 1.
C2.16 vM (¬˙(A∧˙B)) = 1 iff vM (¬˙A) = 1 or vM (¬˙B) = 1, and v(¬˙(A∧˙B)) = 1.
C2.17 vM (A∨˙B) = 1 iff vM (A) = 1 or vM (B) = 1, and v(A∨˙B) = 1.
C2.18 vM (¬˙(A∨˙B)) = 1 iff vM (¬˙A) = 1 and vM (¬˙B) = 1, and v(¬˙(A∨˙B)) =
1.
C2.19 vM ((∃˙α)Aα) = 1 iff vM (Aβ) = 1 for at least one β ∈ C∪O, and v((∃˙α)Aα)
= 1.
C2.20 vM (¬˙(∃˙α)Aα) = 1 iff vM (¬˙Aβ) = 1 for all β ∈ C ∪ O, and v(¬˙(∃˙α)Aα)
= 1.
C2.21 vM ((∃˙10α )Aα) = 1 iff there are β1, ..., β10 ∈ C∪O such that v(β1) 6= v(β2),
v(β1) 6= v(β3),..., v(β9) 6= v(β10), vM (Aβ1) = ... = vM (Aβ10) = 1, and
v((∃˙10α )Aα) = 1.
C2.22 vM (¬˙(∃˙10α )Aα) = 1 iff for all β1, ..., β10 ∈ C ∪ O: if vM (Aβ1) = ... =
vM (Aβ10) = 1 then v(β1) = v(β2) or v(β1) = v(β3) or ... or v(β9) =
v(β10), and v(¬˙(∃˙10α )Aα) = 1.
C2.23 vM ((∀˙α)Aα) = 1 iff vM (Aβ) = 1 for all β ∈ C ∪ O, and v((∀˙α)Aα) = 1.
C2.24 vM (¬˙(∀˙α)Aα) = 1 iff vM (¬˙Aβ) = 1 for at least one β ∈ C ∪ O, and
v(¬˙(∀˙α)Aα) = 1.
Semantic Consequence. Remember that pseudo–constants were introduced mere-
ly as a semantic aid, to simplify the characterization of the quantifiers. However,
pseudo–constants are not allowed in the premises nor the conclusion of argu-
ments. Hence, semantic consequence is defined over formulas that do not con-
tain any pseudo–constants. In other words, semantic consequence is defined over
well–formed formulas of the language Lu∃10.
A well–formed formula A of the language Lu∃10 is verified by a model M iff
vM (A) = 1. Moreover, a model M is a model of a premise set Γ iff M verifies
all elements of Γ . Finally, semantic consequence is defined as follows:
Definition 9 (Semantic Consequence). Γ CLu∃10 A iff A is verified by all
CLu∃10–models of the premise set Γ .
Proof Theory. Proof theoretically, the logic CLu∃10 is characterized completely
by adding the axioms in table 1 to the axiom system of CL∃10 (as described
above). Proofs are defined in the standard way, as sequences of well–formed
formulas each of which is either an axiom, a premise or a formula derived from
earlier ones by application of a rule of inference. Consequently, derivability is
defined as follows:
Definition 10 (Derivability). Γ `CLu∃10 A iff there is a proof of A from
B1, ..., Bn ∈ Γ .
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Table 1. Additional Axioms of CLu∃10
A¬˙ ¬˙A ⊃ A A¬˙¬˙ ¬˙¬˙A ⊃ A
A∧˙ (A∧˙A) ⊃ (A ∧B) A¬˙∧˙ ¬˙(A∧˙B) ⊃ (¬˙A ∨ ¬˙B)
A∨˙ (A∨˙A) ⊃ (A ∨B) A¬˙∨˙ ¬˙(A∨˙B) ⊃ (¬˙A ∧ ¬˙B)
A=˙ (α=˙β) ⊃ (α = β) A¬˙=˙ ¬˙(α=˙β) ⊃ ¬(α = β)
A∃˙ (∃˙α)Aα) ⊃ (∃α)Aα A¬˙∃˙ ¬˙(∃˙α)Aα ⊃ (∀α)¬˙Aα
A∃˙10 (∃˙10α )Aα) ⊃ (∃10α )Aα A¬˙∃˙10 ¬˙(∃˙10α )Aα ⊃ ¬(∃10α )Aα
A∀˙ (∀˙α)Aα ⊃ (∀α)Aα A¬˙∀˙ ¬˙(∀˙α)Aα ⊃ (∃α)¬˙Aα
Soundness and Completeness. Soundness and completeness for the logic
CLu∃10 is easily obtained by extending the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 in [11].
As the extensions are completely straightforward, this is left to the reader.
Theorem 2. Γ `CLu∃10 A iff Γ CLu∃10 A.
4.2 The Adaptive Logic CLs∃10
The lower limit logic (LLL) of the logic CLs∃10 is the logic CL
u
∃10 described in
section 4.1, and the adaptive strategy of CLs∃10 is the normal selections strategy.
Hence, before I can move on to the semantics and the proof theory, the set of
abnormalities Ω still needs to be defined (in section 3 only a general characteri-
zation of Ω has been given — see definition 1).
Definition 11. Ω = Ω1 ∪Ω2 ∪Ω3, with
Ω1 = {(S˙omeα)(Aα, Bα) ∧ (Manyα)(A′α, B′α) | A,B only contain utterance–
symbols; A′, B′ are obtained from respectively A and B by replacing all
utterance–symbols by the corresponding standard symbols}
Ω2 = {(S˙omeα)(Aα, Bα) ∧ (Allα)(A′α, B′α) | A,B only contain utterance–
symbols; A′, B′ are obtained from respectively A and B by replacing all
utterance–symbols by the corresponding standard symbols}
Ω3 = {(M˙anyα)(Aα, Bα) ∧ (Allα)(A′α, B′α) | A,B only contain utterance–
symbols; A′, B′ are obtained from respectively A and B by replacing all
utterance–symbols by the corresponding standard symbols}
By defining Ω in this way, the logic CLs∃10 is only able to capture scalar implica-
tures based on the linguistic scale 〈All, Many, Some〉. Obviously, Ω can easily be
extended in order to capture more scalar implicatures. To keep things as simple
as possible, I will not do so here.
Semantics. The CLs∃10–semantics is based on the LLL–models of a premise set
Γ . More specifically, to generate more consequences than the LLL, the CLs∃10–
consequences are defined by reference to one or multiple selected sets of LLL–
models of Γ , i.e. sets of preferred LLL–models of Γ . Hence, theCLs∃10–semantics
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is a so–called preferential semantics. As the LLL of CLs∃10 is the logic CL
u
∃10,
semantic consequence for the logic CLs∃10 is defined as follows:
Definition 12 (Semantic Consequence). Γ CLs∃10 A iff A is verified by all
elements of some selected sets of CLu∃10–models of Γ .
Defining Selected Sets. Whether a particular CLu∃10–model M of Γ will make
it to a selected set Σ, depends on the abnormal part of M and on the adaptive
strategy of the logic CLs∃10. The abnormal part of a model M is the set of
abnormalities verified by M .
Definition 13. Where M is a CLu∃10–model, the abnormal part of M is the set
Ab(M) = {A ∈ Ω | vM (A) = 1}.
The adaptive strategy makes the actual selection among the CLu∃10–models.
This is done by comparing their abnormal parts. As the adaptive strategy of
the logic CLs∃10 is the normal selections strategy, a selected set Σ is defined
by means of a two–step procedure. First, the minimally abnormal models of a
premise set Γ are defined.
Definition 14. A CLu∃10–model M of Γ is minimally abnormal iff there is no
CLu∃10–model M
′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Secondly, all minimally abnormal models that verify the same abnormalities, are
grouped together into distinct sets. These sets are the selected sets of CLu∃10–
models of a premise set Γ .
Definition 15. Φ(Γ ) = {Ab(M) |M is a minimally abnormal model of Γ}.
Definition 16. A set Σ of CLu∃10–models of Γ is a selected set iff for some
φ ∈ Φ(Γ ), Σ = {M | Ab(M) = φ}.
Proof Theory. As the logicCLs∃10 is a standard adaptive logic, its proof theory
has some characteristic features shared by all adaptive logics (see also [2],[3]).
First of all, a CLs∃10–proof is a succession of stages, each consisting of a sequence
of lines. Adding a line to a proof means to move on to the next stage of the proof.
Next, the lines of a CLs∃10–proof consist of four elements (instead of the usual
three): a line number, a formula, a justification, and an adaptive condition. The
latter is a finite subset of Ω (the set of abnormalities). As long as all elements
of the adaptive condition of a line i can be considered as false, the formula on
line i is considered as derivable from the premise set — remark that this is in
accordance with the intuition set out in section 3. In order to indicate that not all
elements of the adaptive condition of line i can be considered as false anymore,
line i is marked (formally, this is done by placing the symbol X next to the
adaptive condition). Obviously, when a line is marked, the formula on that line
is not considered as derivable anymore. Finally, markings are dynamic: at some
stage of the proof, a line might be unmarked, while at a later stage, it might
14 Hans Lycke
become marked.14 Obviously, this proof theoretic dynamics corresponds to the
dynamics involved in the use of scalar implicatures (as described in section 2).
Characterizing Proofs. Now, consider the CLs∃10–proof theory in particular. It
consists of both deduction rules and a marking definition. The deduction rules
determine how new lines may be added to a proof, while the marking definition
determines at every stage of the proof which lines have to be marked. The
deduction rules are listed in shorthand notation, with
A ∆
expressing that A occurs in the proof on a line with condition ∆. Consider the
deduction rules below:
The Premise Rule (PREM)
If A ∈ Γ : . . . . . .
A ∅
The Unconditional Rule (RU)
If A1, . . . , An `CLu∃10 B: A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
The Conditional Rule (RC)
If A1, . . . , An `CLu∃10 B ∨Dab(Θ) A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
It is easily verified that the deduction rules are fully determined by the logic
CLu∃10 (the LLL of the logic CL
s
∃10) and the set of abnormalities Ω. The mark-
ing definition on the other hand, strongly depends on the adaptive strategy.15
To determine whether or not a line has to be marked at a certain stage of a
proof, the adaptive strategy of the logic CLs∃10, i.e. the normal selections strat-
egy, refers to the Dab–consequences of the premise set that have been derived
at that stage of the proof.
14 For some adaptive logics, lines that are marked might become unmarked as well.
Not for the logic CLs∃10 though.
15 In general, the marking definition constitutes the only difference between the proof
theories of adaptive logics that have identical lower limit logics and sets of abnor-
malities (see e.g. [2]).
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Definition 17. Dab(∆) is a Dab–consequence of a premise set Γ at stage s of
a proof iff Dab(∆) is derived at stage s on the condition ∅.
More specifically, the normal selections strategy lays down that a line i with
condition ∆ has to be marked at stage s in case Dab(∆) is a Dab–consequence
of the premise set at stage s.
Definition 18 (Marking for Normal Selections). Line i is marked at stage
s of the proof iff, where ∆ is its condition, Dab(∆) is a Dab–consequence of Γ
at stage s.
Defining Derivability. A formula A is derivable from a premise set Γ iff A has
been derived as the second element of an unmarked line in a proof from Γ .
However, defining derivability this way is rather problematic. For, markings may
change at every stage, so that for every new stage, it has to be reconsidered
whether or not a formula is derivable from the premise set. Luckily, also a stable
notion of derivability can be defined. It is called final derivability, which refers
to the fact that for some formulas, derivability can only be decided at the final
stage of a proof.
Definition 19. A is finally derived from Γ on a line i of a proof at stage s iff
(i) A is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii)
every extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended
in such a way that line i is unmarked.
Because of its stability, the notion of final derivability is used to define the
CLs∃10–consequence relation.
Definition 20. Γ `CLs∃10 A iff A is finally derived on a line of a proof from Γ .
Soundness and Completeness. AsCLs∃10 is a standard adaptive logic, sound-
ness and completeness follow immediately (see corollary 2 in [3]). Hence, the
soundness and completeness proofs for CLs∃10 needn’t be considered here.
Theorem 3. Γ `CLs∃10 A iff Γ CLs∃10 A.
4.3 The Cookie Conversation
Let’s return to the cookie conversation one final time. Given the conversational
context at hand, the information available to John’s mother is represented as
follows:
(CC) 〈 {(S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα), (M˙anyα)(Cα, Ejα), ¬˙(A˙llα)(Cα, Ejα)} ∪ ∅,
{〈All, Many, Some〉} 〉
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In CC, the set Γu contains all sentences John’s mother heard the nanny ut-
ter. Moreover, these utterances are placed in chronological order (actually, to
represent the application of scalar implicatures in a realistic way, they should
and will also enter the proof in this order). For reasons of simplicity, the set
Γbk is left empty. Nonetheless, this isn’t necessarily the case, for there may
be a lot of background knowledge shared by John’s mother and nanny. For ex-
ample, they might share knowledge about John’s eating habits, his likes and
dislikes, etc. Finally, the set Γ ls only contains one element, viz the linguistic
scale 〈All, Many, Some〉. This doesn’t constitute a problem though, for it is the
only linguistic scale present in this conversational context.
The Cookie Conversation Formally Remastered. The CLs∃10–proof below cap-
tures the cookie conversation from the viewpoint of John’s mother. Hence, the
proof starts with the utterance of the nanny that John ate some cookies (see line
1 below), followed by the defeasible consequences drawn from this utterance by
means of the scalar implicatures based on the scale 〈All, Many, Some〉 (see lines
2 and 3 below).
1 (S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα) –;PREM ∅
2 ¬(Manyα)(Cα, Ejα) 1;RC {(S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα) ∧ (Manyα)(Cα, Ejα)}
3 ¬(Allα)(Cα, Ejα) 1;RC {(S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα) ∧ (Allα)(Cα, Ejα)}
At stage 3 of the proof, no Dab–consequences of the premise set have been
derived yet. Hence, no markings occur and all formulas derived on a line of
the proof are considered as CLs∃10–derivable. However, the proof continues with
the nanny’s utterance that John actually ate a lot of cookies (see line 4). This
obviously forces the withdrawal of one of the pragmatic conclusions drawn by
John’s mother (line 2 is marked).
1 (S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα) –;PREM ∅
2 ¬(Manyα)(Cα, Ejα) 1;RC {(S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα) ∧ (Manyα)(Cα, Ejα)} X
3 ¬(Allα)(Cα, Ejα) 1;RC {(S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα) ∧ (Allα)(Cα, Ejα)}
4 (M˙anyα)(Cα, Ejα) –;PREM ∅
5 (S˙omeα)(Cα, Ejα) ∧ 1,4;RU ∅
(Manyα)(Cα, Ejα)
At stage 5 of the proof, a Dab–consequence has been derived on line 5. As a
consequence, line 2 is marked, meaning that the formula on that line is not
considered as CLs∃10–derivable anymore. On the other hand, line 3 is unmarked
at stage 5 of the proof and it is easily verified that this will remain so, no matter
how the proof is extended (no Dab–consequence yielding the marking of line 3 is
derivable from the premise set). Moreover, this is also confirmed by the nanny’s
final utterance, viz that John didn’t eat all cookies.
... ... ... ...
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6 ¬˙(A˙llα)(Cα, Ejα) –;PREM ∅
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided a formal explication of how hearers apply scalar
implicatures to get at the full intended meaning of uncooperative utterances
(utterances that are not completely in accordance with the Gricean maxims). I
have shown how this can be done in general, by relying on the Adaptive Logics
Programme. More specifically, I have given an outline of how an adaptive logic
SIs for scalar implicatures should look like in general. Moreover, I have also
characterized a particular version of SIs, viz the logicCLs∃10. The latter captures
applications of scalar implicatures based on the linguistic scale 〈All, Many, Some〉.
The logic CLs∃10 does so by treating the scalar implicatures as default rules of
inference. As this is completely in accordance with the characterization of scalar
implicatures given by Levinson in [10], the approach characterized in this paper
adequately explicates the use made of scalar implicatures in conversation.
Further Research. This paper dealt with scalar implicatures, which only consti-
tute a (relatively small) fragment of all possible implicatures. It is still an open
question whether those other implicatures can also be captured by means of
adaptive logics. Moreover, all (scalar) implicatures in this paper were treated as
having an equal priority. This is not always the case though. For, in certain con-
versational contexts, some (scalar) implicatures are given a higher priority than
others. Despite the fact that the logic SIs cannot cope with this phenomenon,
it should be possible to construct prioritized adaptive logics that can.
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